Is the Washington Consensus Dead? by Degol Hailu
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC - IG)
Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar
70052-900    Brasilia, DF -  Brazil
The views expressed in this page are the authors’ and not
necessarily those of  the United Nations Development
Programme or the Government of Brazil.
E-mail: ipc@ipc-undp.org    URL: www.ipc-undp.org
Telephone:   +55 61 2105 5000
The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth is jointly supported
by the Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
and the Government of Brazil.
   April,  2009
No. 82
Is the Washington Consensus Dead?
by Degol Hailu, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
The recent G20 meeting in London elevated the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to a new level. Its lending capacity was tripled
to US$750 billion. In the aftermath of World War II, the IMF was
established to deal with declining commodity prices and
deteriorating international trade. During the oil price shocks of
the 1970s the IMF became lender of last resort, mainly to countries
with balance of payments problems. The debt crisis of the early
1980s in Latin America gave the Fund further impetus. By the mid
1980s the IMF and the World Bank had become policy architects in
low-income countries. The 1998 Asian financial crisis brought the
IMF to the forefront of crisis management. In 2009, we are again at
another milestone—the Fund is back with even greater influence.
The IMF’s past lending practices, however, do not make good
reading. The Fund has shoved the Washington Consensus down
the throats of low- and middle-income countries, often with heavy
conditionalities. According to Williamson (2000: 251), “I invented
the term ‘Washington Consensus’ to refer to the lowest common
denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-
based institutions to Latin American countries”. The advice included
fiscal discipline; cutting tax rates; interest rate liberalisation;
competitive exchange rates; trade liberalisation; liberalisation of
capital flows; privatisation; and deregulation of prices and markets.
The IMF argued that its conditionalities were designed to prevent
moral hazard and adverse selection; to provide credibility to
reforms; and to show commitment to policy change. It applied
the principal-agent problem to development finance. In private
financial markets there is an asymmetry of information. Adverse
selection blurs the distinction between a viable borrower and a
potential defaulter. Moral hazard provides the wrong incentive for
the borrower to engage in risky actions. Similarly, the IMF argues,
concessionary lending may be an incentive for borrowers to
deliberately seek balance of payments crises in order to acquire
funding, and hence the need for conditionalities.
Will the IMF provide the new resources under a post-Washington
Consensus arrangement? Will the financing be free of
conditionalities? The answer is no. Washington Consensus polices
and the associated conditionalities are alive and well. As of today,
the policy prescriptions are the same as those listed by Williamson.
If history is a guide to the future, they are unlikely to change soon.
In 2008 alone there were 224 types of conditionalities imposed
on 15 countries. The table lists just eight of them. The highest
conditionality is in the area of fiscal reforms, followed by
financial liberalisation, privatisation, trade reforms, exchange
rate adjustments and price liberalisation. Conditionalities are also
highest in the least developed countries.
The simple truth is that conditionalities are paternalistic. They are
meant to alter behaviour and induce changes in economic, political
and social structures. They also serve as a sort of collateral; in some
cases they are a form of coercion to ensure adoption of otherwise
unpalatable reforms. Conditionalities trigger conflicts between the
recipient country’s objectives and those of the lender. The lender
enjoys bargaining power over financially dependent recipients
through control of credit tranches. The outcome is usually in favour
of the lender, whose catalytic function and seal of approval give it
powerful leverage. For this reason alone, conditional lending erodes
ownership of reforms.
Developing countries are in critical need of capital flows. Besides the
impact of the current global recession, they still need external finance
to supplement domestic savings. Aid and multilateral credit have
been disappointing. As Moyo (2009) argues, what low-income
countries require are portfolio finance. These types of capital flows
require high credit ratings. The IMF could create mechanisms for
the development of bond markets. It would act as the underwriter,
providing sovereign guarantee schemes to protect the bondholders
against possible default. This would lay the foundations for the much
needed aid exit strategy, instead of perpetuating a failed consensus
along with gratuitous and punitive conditional lending practices.
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 IMF Policy Prescriptions and Conditionalities Imposed in 2008
Djibouti Introduce law to set single-rate VAT at 7 per cent by 2009.
Honduras Adjust tariffs in the electricity sector in line with cost recovery.
Raise interest rate by 25 basis points.
Mali Eliminate all customs exemptions.
Niger Reduce the rate of profit tax from 35 to 30 per cent.
Pakistan Eliminate electricity tariff subsidies.
Republic Introduce commercialisation and phase out fuel price
of Congo subsidies by 2011.
Ukraine Prohibit multiple currency practices.
Achieve a fiscal balance of zero.
Zambia Adjust tariffs in the electricity sector in line with cost recovery.